

Animals ≠ Rights

Animal Rights Frontline

General Rights Args

Pain ≠ Rights

Sentience ≠ Rights

Animals needed for testing

Decisions about animal rights
already decided

Animal rights ↑ anthro.

rights = human creation

animalz ≠ contract to rights

can't function under rights

must understand to act

rights ≠ absolute

existence ≠ rights

Movements Bad/Fail

Welfarist mvts. bad

Reached epoch already

Fail...yeah

Successes still fail

Must change society 1st

Mvts = anthro & stupid

Humanz

Human life = worth more

Human interest in life

Rights2animals ↓ hmn rts

Extinction

Human Extinction = good

Extinction = impossible

Focus on species survival bad

prevent eco crap = anthro

accepting extinction solves

anthro

fear of extinction=anthro

Speciesism

Good

Bad

Acnts. of cruelty = speciest

Morality & Ethics

≠ self conscious

must understand to act

not moral beings

ETC

A/T Util.

A/T animals voting

A/T Zoos good

A/T Singer

A/T Leopold (land rights)

A/T Deep Eco

Narratives good

1-6

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KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

ARB (Animal Rights Bad)
Frontline
(use @ own risk)


1/6

IF HUMANS ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANIMALS WE HAVE NO DUTY TO GIVE THEM RIGHTS

The Illogic of Animal Rights
by J. Neil Schulman 1995

J. NEIL SCHULMAN is the author of two Prometheus award-winning novels
<http://www.pulpless.com/jneil/aniright.html>

★ If human beings are no different from other animals, then like all other animals it is
★ our nature to kill any other animal which serves the purposes of our survival and
well-being, for that is the way of all nature. Therefore, aside from economic
concerns such as making sure we don't kill so quickly that we destroy a species and
deprive our descendants of prey, human animals can kill members of other animal
species for their usefulness to us.
It is only if we are not just another animal -- if our nature is distinctly superior to
other animals -- that we become subject to ethics at all -- and then those ethics must
take into account our nature as masters of the lower animals. We may seek a
balance of nature; but "balance" is a concept that only a species as intelligent as
humankind could even contemplate. We may choose to temper the purposes to
which we put lower animals with empathy and wisdom; but by virtue of our
superior nature, we decide ... and if those decisions include the consumption of
animals for human utilitarian or recreational purposes, then the limits on the uses
we put the lower beasts are ones we set according to our individual human
consciences.



— ANIMALS DON'T HAVE REASON OR CHOICE, THEY GET NO RIGHTS — BY THE WAY WE DON'T ENDORSE THE RHETORIC IN THIS CARD.

Animal "Rights" and the New Man Haters
By Edwin Locke, Ph.D.


<http://www.aynrand.org/objectivism/animals.html> 1995

Animal
rights
need
thought
pittas
→
Animal

Rights are ethical principles applicable only to beings capable of reason and choice. There is only one fundamental right: a man's right to his own life. To live successfully, man must use his rational faculty — which is exercised by choice. The choice to think can be negated only by the use of physical force. To survive and prosper, men must be free from the initiation of force by other men — free to use their own minds to guide their choices and actions. Rights protect men against the use of force by other men.

None of this is relevant to animals. Animals do not survive by rational thought (nor by sign languages allegedly taught to them by psychologists). They survive through inborn reflexes and sensory-perceptual association. They cannot reason. They cannot learn a code of ethics. A lion is not immoral for eating a zebra (or even for attacking a man). Predation is their natural and only means of survival; they do not have the capacity to learn any other.

Only man has the power to deal with other members of his own species by voluntary means: rational persuasion and a code of morality rather than physical force. To claim that man's use of animals is immoral is to claim that we have no right to our own lives and that we must sacrifice our welfare for the sake of creatures who cannot think or grasp the concept of morality. It is to elevate amoral animals to a moral level higher than ourselves — a flagrant contradiction. Of course, it is proper not to cause animals gratuitous suffering. But this is not the same as inventing a bill of rights for them — at our expense.



Every time you masturbate...
God kills a kitten
Please, think of the kittens

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

ARK Frontline

3/6




— ANIMAL RIGHTS ARE THE BEGINNING OF GENOCIDE, BUT REMEMBER THE HOLOCAUST WAS WORST ~~DATA~~ EVER

✓ Rod and Patti Strand, The Hijacking of the Human Movement ^{NH director '93}

★ Today, as in the Nazi era, disillusionment, despair and cynicism are features of the time; they pave the way for new doctrines and political movements that pander to human fears. In German Nazism, the metaphysics of hate were starkly clear. But the version of animalism practiced in England and America, whether centered on individual animals (pets and lab animals for example), or clothed in the larger religion of environmentalism, is not so easily discerned. In German Nazism an identifiable segment of humanity served as the scapegoat. In the modern version, however, the scapegoat target is so immense that the public has trouble grasping its scope: It's the entire human race. It's hard for the public to believe that when Mitchell Fox of PAWS says that because of humans, pet slaughter goes on, or when Michael Fox of HSUS says that human nature is the problem, or when Ingrid Newkirk of PeTA says that humans are the biggest blight on the face of the earth, or when Dave Foreman of Earth First! says that humanity is the cancer of nature and he is the antibody, that they are sharing the very core of their belief system. The animal rights and ~~Error! Bookmark not defined.~~ collectively represent a hate movement that is disillusioned with, and "tired of", the entire human race. These fanatics identify with animals, projecting their feelings of helplessness onto them while they, through some sad route, have disconnected from their own species.

9 w/only The missing element in the animalist philosophy is compassion for human suffering. According to George Bernard Shaw, another banner carrier appropriated for the movement: "The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them. That is the essence of inhumanity." But the animalists contradict this great playwright. They suggest that in the face of human suffering we should look the other way. We should let people starve, stop seeking cures, ignore crippled children, and let nature--Gaia--seek its balance. It is clear that animalists, as in the seventh satanic statement represent "man as just another animal, sometimes better, more often worse than those that walk on all four, who because of his 'divine spiritual and intellectual development' has become the most vicious of all."

★ Animal rights literature is full of articles that urge compassion toward the unheeded cries of animals under human dominion. Yet, they condemn researchers who hear and feel compelled to answer another cry.




Every time you masturbate...

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KNDI GT
ANTHROSHIZDIT

ARB (Animal Rights Bad)
Frontline

4/6 

BUT ^{Animals} ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSH THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY THE BACKLASH WOULD COME FIRST

Michael P. T. LEAHY 1991 (Against Liberation HV 4708 .L43) 214

Utility and western society

★
Am Rts
(FAD)
X
Econ
X
Society
→
deap

But let us, for argument's sake, concede the nutritional point. Whatever weight this would add to the utilitarian scales, would need to be colossal to offset the social and economic ills which might well follow. Frey in *Rights, Killing and Suffering* (1983) paints a detailed picture of the possible downfall of whole economies the minutiae of which, although hinting strongly at overkill, are nonetheless plausible enough to be disturbing (197-203). I will mention only three areas of potential catastrophe. In the first place, a huge number of industries would be undermined, bringing the misery of unemployment to employees and their families where alternative jobs were not available. Many localities in Europe are dominated by livestock and poultry farming and vaster areas such as the states of Iowa, South Dakota and Texas are deeply involved. Argentina, Australia and New Zealand would have a considerable proportion of their national economies wiped out. Secondly, our social lives would need readjustment. If it is difficult to change habits like smoking or drinking, despite the best of intentions, then the switch to nut steaks and vegetable lasagne might

be just as painful, and for those forced to it because of the unavailability of meat it would also be deeply resented. Most traditional French, Italian, British, American and even Oriental restaurants would cease to exist in their present forms. Thirdly, the idea of the European countryside, valuable to many as a source of beauty, history, and national pride would also be transformed. Sheep would not safely graze nor would spring lambs nor calves; the average farmer could hardly be expected to stock them for old times' sake. Clark is beady-eyed in his dismissal of what he seems to regard as sentimentality:

We are entitled to ask why it matters, if it is true, that there should be no such poor slaves to be seen. Because we get aesthetic pleasure from the scene, and are therefore entitled to instigate whatever distress be necessary to achieve our satisfaction?



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ANY EVEN IF ANIMALS HAD RIGHTS, THERE'S NO REASON FOR
IN PARTICULAR

Kevin DOLAN 1999 (Ethics, Animals and Science SThl
(JusCan), BD, DipLaw, FIAT. HV 4708 .D58) pg. 138

What rights could animals have?

If the existence of animal rights is conceded, it may with justification be asked: what are those rights? How has a widespread ignorance of them lingered down the ages? Who conferred them and with what authority? Are they analogous with human rights? Animal rights campaigners tend to be coy about these consequential questions, tending to dismiss them as trivial details, insignificant in the presence of their high ideals. It might, with justification, be asked if 'right' is the *mot juste* for what the campaigners are advocating. As Professor Joad (1891-1953) was wont to say: 'It depends on what you mean by rights.'

The most widely known and most easily understood rights are legal rights. Salmon, the learned jurist, defined legal rights as 'an interest recognized and protected by the law, respect for which is a duty and disregard of which is a wrong'. In the light of this definition, talk of animal rights seems out of place in the absence of clear legal statements on the topic, either in the UK or abroad. Few, however, would regard rights as solely legal. We talk of rights outside a legal context. When the justice of


Animal rights 139

legislation is questioned, as was done in the case of apartheid, or when legal reform is called for, appeal is made to rights beyond the law - (moral rights). If it were not taken for granted that there are rights outside and indeed above the law, by which the law itself can be judged, such an appeal would be to non-existing entities.

These moral rights are on a higher level than legal rights. For most people down the ages, these higher obligations drew their force from religious authority. Outside the orbit of moral theology the notion of moral rights had its basis in conscience, in personal awareness of correct behaviour or in a sense of duty (shades of the categorical imperative of Kant).

Moral rights, though less clearly defined, are more enduring than legal rights. Some legal rights which are more or less now universally accepted, for example the right to property, were in the past denied by many legislative systems to some sections of the community. In spite of such legal attitudes there is evidence that reformers considered such rights, as the right to property, existed for all people, whether granted by law or not. The foundation of such claims to rights could not have been based on laws that did not then exist but they were regarded as moral rights. Under such moral pressure, legislation like the Married Women's Act (1882), transformed these presumed moral rights into legal rights.

Natural rights are even more ambiguous than moral rights. Their vagueness has not excluded them from the arena of controversy on animal use and abuse. Natural rights appear to arise from the nature of things as they are or as they are thought to be by the proponents of specific natural rights. A famous historical exposition of such rights can be found in the Declaration of Rights associated with the French Revolution: 'Man is born free...'. This implied a right to freedom arising from the innate nature of man. Can similar natural rights be argued for, on the basis of the nature of animals? The nature of many animals implies the need to roam and the power to adjust to their environment. Are they also 'born free' or do they inherit an analogous right to freedom?



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Please, think of the kittens

KNDE GT
Anthro Shiznit

ARB Frontline

6/6

Animals & Rights

Animal Rights would kill us in so many ways by massive deprivation.
Here's 56 things ^{id} lose.

Kathleen MAR-KWART 93 (Kathleen Marquardt, Chariman of Putting People First, "Animal Scam") p.4

The breadth of this ambition—what I call "animal apartheid"—is staggering.

It means no hunting, fishing, or trapping. No livestock farming or ranching. No use of animals in science or education; no animal bone marrow to treat blood disorders, or animal blood to treat Rh factor types. No beef, pork, lamb, chicken, fish, eggs, or even honey. No leather shoes, fur collars, wool sweaters, down jackets or comforters, or even silk.⁵ (21)

And this just scratches the surface. No zoos, aquariums, circuses, rodeos, horse racing, carriage rides, or animal actors in films. No butter, cheese, yogurt, or Ben & Jerry's Rainforest Crunch ice cream. No meat-byproducts in your dog and cat food—not that it makes any difference, because there would be no pets.⁶ (25)

And more: Candies, crayons, gelatin, marshmallows, drywall, home insulation, linoleum, candles, soap, glue, brake fluid, and heart valves—even the runway foam used for aircraft with disabled landing gear—all would be forbidden under an animal rights regime. (41)

Make no mistake about it: animal rights means no milk for our children, no insulin for diabetics, and no guide dogs for the blind.⁷ No rat traps could mean the return of the bubonic plague.) No pest control means widespread (malaria.) No whole-animal models means that biomedical researchers will be hamstrung trying to control such epidemics. (53)

Yet this movement has become a multimillion dollar industry supported by many Hollywood celebrities, from Candice Bergen to Kim Basinger—who make their fabulous incomes on film emulsion, an animal product.

Animal rights is a disaster) not just for humanity, but for animals as well. It rejects the concept of animal welfare. That means no wildlife management, veterinary medicine, or captive breeding of endangered species. It means needless suffering and death for both people and animals, and even the extinction of some species. Animal rights is not out to improve animal care but to abolish it.



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Species capable of sentiment and pain still should NOT HAVE RIGHTS

White, 1989 [Alan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 121]

Something capable only of sentience or of suffering would not necessarily be capable of exercising, owning, or enjoying a right, much less of claiming, asserting, insisting on, or fighting for its rights or of waiving or relinquishing them. Nor of having obligations, duties, privileges, etc. And though it would be capable of having something done for it or of being in a certain state, it would not necessarily be capable of performing tasks, assuming attitudes, or having emotions. Hence, its possible rights, if any, would be confined to the right to have something done for it, such as to be well treated or protected, or to be in a certain state, such as to be happy or free or to remain alive. Moreover, though sentience or capacity to suffer would be necessary for the possible possession of a right to anything relevant to these, such as a right to protection from suffering—because a right to V implies being logically able to V—they would not be sufficient. The fact that an animal can suffer from growing pains or a man suffer from doubt does not in itself prove that it or he is capable of a right to protection from these.

It is a misunderstanding to object to this distinction between the kinds of things which can have rights and those which cannot on the ground that it constitutes a sort of speciesism.⁹ For it is not being argued that it is right to treat one species less considerately than another, but only that one species, that is, a person, can sensibly be said to exercise or waive a right, be under an obligation, have a duty, etc., whereas another cannot, however unable particular members of the former species may be to do so.

Species
Capable
of sentience
and
pain
still
should
not
have
rights.

Speciesism
is a bad
argument



RNDZ GT
Anthro shiz

Sentience & Rts

2/2

Sentience not valid judge of rights

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 19 1

The primary argument from sentience is that whatever is sentient has a right to life. It is weaker than the prudential argument in that it does depend on animals not being machines (and many people are not convinced of this in the sense that they doubt the behavioral evidence that animals have conscious feelings). It is also weak because there is no explanation why the characteristic of sentience should entitle an entity to rights, minimally to the right to life, or as in the argument below, to the right not to be made to suffer unnecessarily. The appeal to sentience is, however, better than the appeal to mere existence, for at least there is a generally accepted way of distinguishing between sentient and insentient existence (for the same reason the appeal to life is better than the appeal to mere existence). Nevertheless, all these appeals suffer from the same problem. Why, one must ask, does the mere possession of sentience (or in some versions, merely of life) endow an entity with the right to life or to relief from unnecessary suffering, let alone a right to a comfortable habitat in order to live out its natural life?

() w/o sense of self, no rights are possible

Hargrove, Professor in Department of Philosophy, 1992. [Eugene C., University of North Texas, State U. of NY Press]

who sense of self,
no Rts possible

above to a non-self-conscious being could be made only by one who is self-conscious. Consider a being who is sentient but not self-conscious. Such a being presumably experiences sensations of pain and pleasure, but has no experience of self. Without any sense of self, this being would also have no sense of continuity, no notion or memory of past experience as its own, and no anticipation of future experience. Some people have thus suggested that non-self-conscious animals live only in the present. They experience pain and pleasure only in the moment. Now I think that merely spelling this out is enough to show its inadequacy. Even if sensations are experienced only in the moment, to be experienced they must be experienced as one's own by a temporally restricted self-consciousness. Even Hume's atomic impression and ideas have a character of awareness. It seems obvious that self-awareness is essential to sentience, or to experience of any kind.



KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT
Good

Animals = useful
Research

ANIMALS ARE KEY IN RESEARCH TO SAVE ANIMAL + HUMAN LIVES

JACK H. BOTTING 2/97 "Animal Research" Scientific Am. retired lecturer, active in defense of animal research.


<http://www.sciam.com/0297issue/0297botting.html>

In truth, there are no basic differences between the physiology of laboratory animals and humans. Both control their internal biochemistry by releasing endocrine hormones that are all essentially the same; both humans and laboratory animals send out similar chemical transmitters from nerve cells in the central and peripheral nervous systems, and both react in the same way to infection or tissue injury. Animal models of disease are unjustly criticized by assertions that they are not identical to the conditions studied in humans. But they are not designed to be so; instead such models provide a means to study a particular procedure. Thus, cystic fibrosis in mice may not exactly mimic the human condition (which varies considerably among patients anyway), but it does provide a way to establish the optimal method of administering gene therapy to cure the disease. Opponents of animal experiments also allege that most illness can be avoided by a change of lifestyle; for example, adoption of a vegan diet that avoids all animal products. Whereas we support the promulgation of healthy practices, we do not consider that our examples could be prevented by such measures.

Animal testing will save ~~thousands~~ million of human lives.

Locke, Professor of Management and Psychology at the University of Maryland at College Park [Edwin A., <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Takingsides1.html>, "Animals and Rights?," September 29]

The proper attitude of humans toward animals should include compassion. Because animals can feel pain, it would be cruel to cause them gratuitous or unnecessary suffering. But there is a difference between compassion and constitutional rights. Using animals for medical research is morally legitimate and has and will help save millions of human lives.



KNDI GT
Anthro 600 d

Animals = Use for Testing

Testing on animals has advanced human life by 28 years.

Hsieh, Law Student, Harvard University, 1994 [Diana, <http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/tdoar.html>, "The Dangers of Animal Rights," December 6]
But granting and attempting to protect animal rights would be disastrous to humans, as well as to the detriment of many animals. Humans derive enormous benefit from medical testing on animals; in fact human life has been extended by 28 years by the very tests that animal rights activists are so quick to denounce as "useless torture." (Hughes 35) A National Review article reported that "animal research has led to vaccines against diphtheria, polio, measles, mumps, whopping cough, effective treatment of diabetes, and control of infection through antibiotics." (56-7) Although computer simulations and cell cultures can be used instead of animals in some medical research, human lives would be sacrificed by relying too extensively upon such methods because they are more simplistic than actual living systems and can omit crucial variables. The human consumption of meat is also attacked by animal rights activists as an unnecessary and unnatural part of human life. But human life is not just mere survival; happiness, comfort, and the enjoyment of life all make life worth living, and thinking strictly in terms of survival unnecessarily restricts human potential. By analogy, just because a woman can physically survive locked in her house, periodically beaten by her husband, doesn't mean that she ought to pursue such a life or that others should force her into it.]

mean

RNDI GT
Anthro 5117

Decisions about Animal Rights already decided.

Any decision regarding animal vs. human rights
has already been subconsciously decided.

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

Animals as Property: An Unbalanced Balance

The reason for the profound inconsistency between what we say about animals and how we actually treat them is the status of animals as our *property*.¹⁶ Animals are commodities that we own and that have no value other than that which we as property owners choose to give them. The property status of animals renders completely meaningless any balancing that is supposedly required under the humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws, because what we really balance are the interests of property owners against the interests of their animal property. It does not take much knowledge of property law or economics to recognize that such a balance will rarely, if ever, tip in the animal's favor. If someone suggested that you balance your interests against those of your automobile or your wristwatch, you would quite correctly regard the suggestion as absurd. Your automobile and your watch are your property. They have no morally significant interests; they are merely *things* that have no value except that which you, the owner, accord to them. Because animals are merely property, we are generally permitted to ignore their interests and to inflict the most horrendous pain and suffering or death on them when it is economically beneficial to us.

[We say that we can prefer animal interests over human interests but only when necessary to do so, but it is always necessary to decide against animals in order to protect human property rights in animals. We are allowed to interpret necessary suffering as *any* suffering needed to use our animal property for a particular purpose—even if that purpose is our mere convenience or pleasure. We treat *every* human/animal interaction as analogous to the burning house conflict. The human property interest will almost always prevail. The animal in question is always a "pet" or a "laboratory" animal, or a "game" animal, or a "food" animal, or a "rodeo" animal, or some other form of animal property that exists solely for our use and has no value except as a means to *our* ends. There is really no choice to be made between the human and the animal interest because the choice has already been predetermined by the property status of the animal.]

"I'm Pavlov's porthound
when I hear a bong clink
my eyes set unclink"

RNDJ GT
Anthroshiz

Animals w/ rights \nrightarrow Anthro.

An effort to keep animals out of the rights realm
is an effort to prevent anthropocentrism

Hargrove, Professor in Department of Philosophy, 1992. [Eugene C., University of North Texas,
State U. of NY Press]

Try to keep
animals non-
moral agents


Perhaps this is to anthropomorphize, but merely to attribute self-consciousness to an entity on the basis of its behavior—particularly its apparently intentionally communicative behavior about what one must infer are its own interests and desires—is *not* in fact to anthropomorphize the entity. My guess is that the worry about anthropomorphizing animals often stems from a desire to keep them out of the moral milieu, much as Descartes refuses them self-consciousness in part because he does not think they have Christian souls. But mere possession of sentience and self-consciousness, intelligence and rationality, interests and desires, and the ability to communicate about one's self, none or all of these makes an entity a moral agent in a moral milieu. Self-consciousness is indeed the foundational necessary condition for moral agency, but like the sentience which is linked to it, is far from being a sufficient condition.



"Fat guy in a little red..."

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHZNIT

Rights = human
creation



Rights = human creation


Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 6-7]

Rights
are a
human
creation

Most notions of moral, legal, divinely ordained, natural, and "ordinary" rights and duties apply primarily to relations among human beings, their institutions, and their gods. Ordinarily or naturally (in the West) human beings are thought to have rights to life, liberty, and property or the pursuit of interests, and duties to behave fairly or equitably. There is, however, enough world-wide cultural variation to suggest that rights and duties may be human conceptual artifacts. Because I want to contrast two extreme positions, I assume for one of them that natural and ordinary rights and duties are informal human inventions, just as legal rights and duties are formal inventions. Also, at this extreme, gods and divinely ordained rights and duties, as well

as moral rights and duties, are assumed to be human inventions, as suggested by the immense variety of gods, religions, and moral codes that proliferate in human history. This stance is anti-supernatural. It is the position that human beings and all their works—including rights and duties—are natural in the sense of being a part of nature. However, those who hold this position have not generally found that entities other than humans inhabit the moral milieu. Morality, while natural, is apparently a cultural artifact unique to human beings. I call this the empirical position.

morality
is
human



KNOW GT
Anthro Shiz

Animals ≠ contract to rts

Animals ≠ have contracts to rights

Regan, author, 1989 [Tom, ed. Regan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 106]

ANIMALS
\$ RTS.

[Here, very crudely, is the root idea: morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract (hence the name contractarianism). Those who understand and accept the terms of the contract are covered directly; they have rights created and recognized by, and protected in, the contract. And these contractors can also have protection spelled out for others who, though they lack the ability to understand morality and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved or cherished by those who can. Thus young children, for example, are unable to sign contracts and lack rights. But they are protected by the contract nonetheless because of the sentimental interests of others, most notably their parents. So we have, then, duties involving these children, duties regarding them, but no duties to them. Our duties in their case are indirect duties to other human beings, usually their parents.

As for animals, since they cannot understand contracts, they obviously cannot sign; and since they cannot sign, they have no rights. Like children, however, some animals are the object of the sentimental interest of others. You, for example, love your dog or cat. So those animals that enough people care about (companion animals, whales, baby seals, the American bald eagle), though they lack rights themselves, will be protected because of the sentimental interests of people. I have, then, according to contractarianism, no duty directly to your dog or any other animal, not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffering; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to those people who care about what happens to them. As for other animals, where no or little sentimental interest is present—in the case of farm animals, for example, or laboratory rats—what duties we have grow weaker and weaker, perhaps to the vanishing point. The pain and death they endure, though real, are not wrong if no one cares about them. 100

"I am Jack's colon.
I get cancer.
I kill Jack."

RNDI 61
Author Shaz

Animals & function under rts

Only an actor that can function under
the context of rights may have rights

White, 1989 [Alan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 120]

[In the full language of "a right" only a *person* can logically have a right because only a *person* can be the subject of such predications. Rights are not the sorts of things of which non-persons can be the subjects, however right it may be to treat them in certain ways. Nor does this, as some contend, exclude infants, children, the feeble-minded, the comatose, the dead, or generations yet unborn.² Any of these may be for various reasons empirically unable to fulfil the full role of a right-holder. But so long as they are *persons*—and it is significant that we think and speak of them as young, feeble-minded, incapacitated, dead, unborn *persons*—they are logically possible subjects of rights to whom the full language of rights can significantly, however falsely, be used. It is a misfortune, not a tautology, that these persons cannot exercise or enjoy, claim, or waive, their rights or do their duty or fulfil their obligations. The law has always linked together the notions of a person and of the bearer of rights, duties, privileges, powers, liberties, liabilities, immunities, etc., so that a change in application of one notion has accompanied a parallel change in application of the other.³ Thus, at various times in the law, gods, idols, unborn and dead human beings, animals, inanimate things, corporations, and governments, have been treated as persons because they were conceived as possible subjects of such jural relations as rights, duties, etc. who can commit or be the victims of torts and crimes. In Roman law slaves were things, not persons, and, hence, had no rights. The attitudes of various legal systems to the possible rights of an unborn child depend on how far they are regarded as legal persons.⁴]

"If I had a tumor,
I'd name it Marla Singer."

KNOI 6T

Anthro 5hr 2

Animals \neq understand rights,

1/2

()

Animals lack capacity to understand violation of rights

Hsieh, Law Student, Harvard University, 1994 [Diana, <http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/tioar.html>, "The Dangers of Animal Rights," December 6]

Animals lack capacity to understand violation

Determining the necessary attributes of rights-bearing creature is a difficult task, so let me illustrate, with an example, the principles involved. A man, much to his dismay, is being devoured by a ferocious tiger. The man, in an attempt to stop the tiger, yells, "Stop you criminal! Rights violator! Initiator of force!" Clearly this is not only an ineffective strategy, but also an incorrect use of terminology. Why can't we rightfully accuse the tiger of violating rights? In short, because he cannot reason and lacks free will. And for these very same reasons, we cannot say that the tiger has rights himself, because rights are a set of reciprocal relationships, or in other words, only the animals that have rights are expected to respect the rights of others.]

of rights

One must comprehend rights to possess them

"They could come in a black pack, w/ skull & crossbones on the front... called 'Terrors' and smoke would like upward & the black."

White, 1989 [Alan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 120]

A right is something which can be said to be exercised, earned, enjoyed, or given, which can be claimed, demanded, asserted, insisted on, secured, waived, or surrendered; there can be a right to do so and so or have such and such done for one, to be in a certain state, to have a certain feeling or adopt a certain attitude. A right is related to and contrasted with a duty, an obligation, a privilege, a power, a liability. A possible possessor of a right is, therefore, whatever can properly be spoken of in such language; that is, whatever can intelligibly, whether truly or falsely, be said to exercise, earn, etc. a right, to have a right to such logically varied things, to have duties, privileges, etc. Furthermore, ... a necessary condition of something's being capable of having a right to V is that it should be something which logically can V.

to deserve a right, one must

comprehend the concept of rights

KNDI GT
Anthro shiz

Animals & understand rights

() Animals & understand rights

2/2

2/2

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 16]

Singer now goes on to deny that a level of intelligence permitting the understanding of rights is required to have them (although he says above that lack of understanding debar the dog from voting). In arguing that the principle of equality must "be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman,"¹¹ Singer says that "If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?"¹² But it is not the degree of intelligence *per se* that is significant to the possession of rights here, but rather what is understood. The relevant difference is that humans have a general capacity to understand moral principles such as those involved in voting, or concerning rights and duties, whereas many nonhumans do not.

humans understand
more by animals
don't

- You know Wayne
If you're not careful,
you're going to lose me.
- I lost you 3 months ago.
Am I mental?
C'mon in the now!

RNDI GT
Anthro student

Rights ≠ Absolute

1.) RIGHTS NOT ABSOLUTE

Frandoni, Professor of Law, 2000. [Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?

For example, our right of free speech protects our interest in self-expression even if other people do not value that expression and would stifle our expression merely because it would benefit them. Rights, however, are not absolute in the sense that their protection has no exception. For example, my right of free speech does not protect my falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded movie theater or my making false and defamatory statements about another. In those cases, my interest in speech is not protected, but in neither case is any attempt made to censor the content of my speech merely because others disagree with me.]

"who carries nunchucks
in their pants?"

KNDJ GT
Anthony Shize

Existence \neq Rts

Existence and Non-Existence are useless
in making rights distinctions.

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 10]

Aff
Existence
useless to
make
decisions

But it is usual that moral systems be general or universal in the sense that their attributions do not depend on the mere existence of the entities evaluated. As Kant argued, existence itself is not a characteristic useful for designating the character or essence of a thing. Further, a primary use of moral systems is to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong, among existing entities. Existence and nonexistence are obviously useless for making such a distinction. Note that *mutatis mutandis* the same objection holds if it is proposed that whatever is living has a right to life. Now some ecological moralists may in fact mean to assert that all that exists or is alive thereby has the right to existence or to life. Even if this is true, one awaits an argument for it.

Existence does not justify having rights

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 10]

Existence
 \neq have
Rights

Mere existence is not adequate to explain or to justify possession of rights. The next step, then, is to suggest that an ecological system gains its right to existence because of its function. "The land" might be said to earn its right to existence because it makes possible the existence of all the individual elements in it. If the argument were no more than this, it would revert to the view that mere existence is a value, for in effect all that is claimed is that whatever makes existence possible itself has a right to be. The argument also swallows its own tail, for the entity whose existence it makes possible is itself. And I disallow the

FIGHT THE POWER!

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

MOVEMENTS FAIL

WELFARIST REFORMS DEFEAT THEMSELVES

Peter R. WICKLUND 11/97 in: J. L. S. 504

AWA

+ welfare

9/3

+ 7/2

1/2

2

str.

[Such welfarist reforms, Francione argues, do not and cannot translate into long-term achievement of animal rights. New welfarism, he asserts, suffers from a structural defect: It seeks to eliminate animal suffering, but at the same time it reinforces the property structure responsible for that suffering. Francione makes this point with the hypothetical example of a law requiring that cows awaiting slaughter receive water (pp. 141-48). Animal welfarists would support such a law as a "step [] in the right direction" or a "springboard into animal rights" (p. 141). Francione, however, maintains that such a law, by regulating the property regime would necessarily also legitimize the system that allows humans to treat cows as property. He agrees that cows have an interest in receiving water; yet he believes that so long as the cows remain human property, "the body of institutional exploitation produces (new) types of suffering as soon as older ones are removed" (p. 145). Francione sets down criteria for pragmatic, incremental activism that nonetheless eliminates the institutionalized exploitation engendered in the deprivation of rights. n14 Animal rights activists must seek legislation n15 that prohibits - and does not refine activities constitutive of the exploitative institutions (pp. 192-203), without substituting any other form of exploitation in place of the prohibited activity (pp. 207-11). n16 Such activism, he contends, will recognize and respect noninstitutional animal interests.

my bien



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

KNDI 6T
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

MOVEMENTS Fail

— MOVEMENTS HAVE MADE LITTLE HEADWAY

Peter SINGER Bioethics, Princeton 1990 Animal Liberation p. 420-41

AT: There has been opposition to experimenting on animals for a
ARTS long time. This opposition has made little headway because ex-
perimenters, backed by commercial firms that profit by supply-
ing laboratory animals and equipment, have been able to con-
vince legislators and the public that opposition comes from
MUMMNT uninformed fanatics who consider the interests of animals more
important than the interests of human beings. But to be opposed
to what is going on now it is (not necessary) to insist that all ani-
mal experiments stop immediately. All we need to say is that ex-
periments serving no direct and urgent purpose should stop im-
mediately, and in the remaining fields of research, we should,
whenever possible, seek to replace experiments that involve ani-
mals with alternative methods that do not.

— THE ANIMAL RIGHTS GROUPS HAVE DONE ALL THEY CAN


BUFFALO NEWS 5.8.00

Even this was not enough. PETA then proposed a campaign modeled on those milk carton pictures of missing children. Its replica would display a "missing" cow, lost to animal medical experimentation. Imagine how that must have affected families looking for their lost children.

I believe that PETA and other animal-rights organizations played an important, positive role in changing the way animals are cared for in medical research and surgical practice. Modern animal research facilities are very different from their counterparts a half-century ago. Today, alternatives to

AN animals such as nonliving models, computer simulations and tissue cultures are
REF employed whenever possible. The number of animals used is way down: Over the
past 20 years, the total has been reduced 28 percent; the number of cats and
dogs, more than 99 percent. In fact, today more than 95 percent of the animals
in research labs are rats and mice. The legislated standards for facilities are
extremely strict. In each of the six universities in which I taught, for
example, proposals for animal experimentation or other use had first to be
reviewed by broadly representative committees. And lab inspections are
The Buffalo News, May 8, 2000 ++
regularly scheduled.

ALL Thus, the animal-rights groups have achieved an honorable victory, and we
COW should credit them for that. Unfortunately, they will not be satisfied until all
animal research activities are stopped. (Of interest is the fact that they
appear quite happy to accept experimentation on humans.)



KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHENIT

MOVEMENTS Fail


— ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FAILS SEVERAL REASONS

Peter SINGER Bioethics, Princeton 1990 Animal Liberation p. 218-22

1 There are several reasons for the failure of the animal welfare establishment to take action against the most important kinds of cruelty. One is historical. When first founded, the RSPCA and ASPCA were radical groups, far ahead of the public opinion of their times, and opposed to all forms of cruelty to animals, including cruelty to farm animals, who then, as now, were the victims of many of the worst abuses. Gradually, however, as these organizations grew in wealth, membership, and respectability, they lost their radical commitment and became part of the "establishment." They built up close contacts with members of the government, and with businessmen and scientists. They tried to use these contacts to improve the conditions of animals, and some minor improvements resulted; but at the same time contacts with those whose basic interests are in the use of animals for food or research purposes blunted the radical criticism of the exploitation of animals that had inspired the founders. Again and again the societies compromised their fundamental principles for the sake of trivial reforms. Better some progress now than nothing at all, they said; but often the reforms proved ineffective in improving the conditions of the animals, and functioned rather to reassure the public that nothing further needed to be done.⁶

As their wealth increased, another consideration became important. The animal welfare societies had been set up as registered charities. This status brought them substantial tax savings; but it is a condition of being registered as a charity, in both Great Britain and the United States, that the charitable organization does not engage in political activities. Political action, unfortunately, is sometimes the only way to improve the conditions of animals (especially if an organization is too cautious to call for public boycotts of animal products), but most of the large groups kept well clear of anything that might endanger their charitable status. This has led them to emphasize safe activities like collecting stray dogs and prosecuting individual acts of wanton cruelty, instead of broad campaigns against systematic cruelty.

Finally, at some point during the last hundred years the major animal welfare societies lost interest in farm animals. Perhaps this was because the supporters and officials of the societies came from the cities and knew more and cared more about dogs and cats than about pigs and calves. Whatever the reason, for most of the present century, the literature and publicity of the old established groups made a significant contribution to the prevailing attitude that dogs and cats and wild animals need protection, but other animals do not. Thus people came to think of "animal welfare" as something for kindly ladies who are dotty about cats, and not as a cause founded on basic principles of justice and morality.




KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

MOVEMENTS Fail

— FUR INDUSTRY PROVES, APPARENT SUCCESSSES ONLY MAKE
THE PROBLEM HARDER TO SOLVE

Gary L. **FRANCIONE** law, Rutgers Winter 96 Rutgers L. Rv.

In the area of furs, Finsen and Finsen state that the "antifur campaign is one campaign in which activists can claim to have made progress." n132 They acknowledge, however, that "knowing with any degree of assurance to what extent a variety of potential causal factors was operative in the fur slump is enormously difficult." n133 Moreover, they observe that "at the same time that the [fur] market is very bad, the fur industry in the United States is also undergoing some changes that may have profound implications for the anti-fur movement." n134 Finsen and Finsen cite the widespread opening of foreign markets for fur, especially in Japan, and "even more ominous," they point to the increase in imported fur coats and the emergence of vertically-integrated companies, such as Jindo, a South Korean company, that manages all phases of the fur operation from ranching to retail selling. n135 In addition, cheaper furs made abroad, as well as excess supply in the United States, may create greater demand as prices inevitably fall.



KODI GT
ANTHRO STIZENIT

MOVEMENTS

MOVEMENTS DO NOTHING WITHOUT PUBLIC CHANGE

HOUSTON CHRONICLE 1.04.00 1/n

None of the activists' efforts will succeed without public support, said Francione, whose textbook Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or Your Dog will be published in January.

The Houston Chronicle January 09, 2000, Sunday ++

"Let's assume somebody passed a law tomorrow saying, 'No more meat-eating,' " suggested Francione - who follows a vegan diet, as do his six dogs. "People would be rioting in the streets. The legal system can't get too far out in front of public sentiment"

"If we are going to change significantly the status of animals in our culture, we first need to work on social attitudes."

Indeed, said Daniel Oliver, author of Animal Rights: The Inhumane Crusade, "most people have never had any moral qualms" about owning animals. Will people ever agree with the activists and give up ownership of their pets?

"I think (activists) have been successful in getting people to think about animals as individuals, not just as food or as property."

YOU'VE GOT TO CHANGE PUBLIC ATTITUDES 1ST


HOUSTON CHRONICLE 1.04.00 1/n

The issue of legal standing is one of the biggest for the animal-rights movement. It's the reason Francione says that action in the legislature, not the courts, is the best way to gain broader rights for animals.

"We didn't get rid of slavery by having a bunch of lawyers bring court challenges," he said.

But he acknowledges that change will most likely come slowly.

"Until we really, as a culture, confront the fact that we're eating 8 billion of them a year, all the rest is nonsense," he said.



KNDI
Anthro Shiznit

Animal Rights Mvt = Anthropocentric
↓
sentimental

Animal rights supporters are still
rooted in pro-human ideals

Pearce, Author and Philosopher, 1995 [David, The Hedonistic Imperative]

Caring about the plight of the non-human victims of our actions is not a case of sentimental bunny-hugging nor of child-like anthropomorphism. Nor is it a matter of caring more about animals than humans; nor even, as is sometimes suggested with all appearance of seriousness, outright misanthropy. "Tender-minded" people who worry about the torture of non-humans are on balance temperamentally more rather than less inclined to act in an effort to minimise human suffering too. Such contrasts and false antitheses are in any case unhelpful. Simply in abstaining from eating meat, for instance, one can still spend just as much time campaigning for exclusively human causes as one did as a practising carnivore.

The animal rights movement is
just messy silliness

Kheel, 1989 [Marti, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 256]

Interestingly, the field of environmental ethics is an outgrowth of two movements that were (and are) highly charged emotionally—i.e., the animal rights and environmental movements. Significantly, the members (mostly women)² of the early animal rights movement were often labeled "animal lovers" or "sentimentalists" in an attempt to belittle their concerns. But, as James Turner points out, "animal lovers were not ashamed to admit that their campaign to protect brutes from abuse was more the result of sentiment than of reason."³

Marti Kheel is co-founder of Feminists for Animal Rights and is a frequent contributor to professional journals in moral, political, and social philosophy.

Reprinted with permission from Marti Kheel, "The liberation of nature: A circular affair," *Environment Ethics* 7 (1985), pp. 141-49.

animal
rights
is more
sentimental
and
less
rasm

vanna = calisher!

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT


Human life is still worth more than animal life.

Peter Singer 85 (philosophy, bioethics, Monash University. Author, "In Defense of Animals" prologue) p. 89

AT: I think we will emerge from the present decade with a significantly different attitude towards the sanctity of human life, an attitude which considers the quality of the life at stake rather than the simple matter of whether the life is or is not that of a member of the species *Homo sapiens*. Once this happens, we shall be ready to take a much broader view of the wrongness of killing, one in which the capacities of the being in question will play a central role. Such a view will not discriminate on the basis of species alone but will still draw a distinction between the seriousness of killing beings with the mental capacities of normal human adults and killing beings who do not possess, and never have possessed, these mental capacities. It is not a bias in favour of our own species that leads us to think that there is greater moral significance in taking the life of a normal human than there is in taking the life of, for example, a fish. To give just one

reason for this distinction, a normal human has hopes and plans for the future: to take the life of a normal human is therefore to cut off these plans and to prevent them from ever being fulfilled. Fish, I expect, do not have as clear a conception of themselves as beings with a past and a future. Consequently, to kill a fish is not to prevent the fulfilment of any plans, or at least not of any long-range future plans. This does not, I stress, mean that it is all right, or morally trivial, to kill fish. If fish are capable of enjoying their lives, as I believe they are, we do better when we let them continue to live than when we needlessly end their lives, though when we cut short the life of a fish, we are not doing something as bad as when we needlessly end the life of a normal human adult.

146



- 1) The purpose of human rights is to act upon them, Animals cannot do this.

Regan, author, 1989 [Tom, ed. Regan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 105]

How to proceed? We begin by asking how the moral status of animals has been understood by thinkers who deny that animals have rights. Then we test the mettle of their ideas by seeing how well they stand up under the heat of fair criticism. If we start our thinking in this way, we soon find that some people believe that we have no duties directly to animals, that we owe nothing to them, that we can do nothing that wrongs them. Rather, we can do wrong acts that involve animals, and so we have duties regarding them, though none to them. Such views may be called indirect duty views. By way of illustration: suppose your neighbor kicks your dog. Then your neighbor has done something wrong. But not to your dog. The wrong that has been done is a wrong to you. After all, it is wrong to upset people, and your neighbor's kicking your dog upsets you. So you are the one who is wronged, not your dog. Or again: by kicking your dog your neighbor damages your property. And since it is wrong to damage another person's property, your neighbor has done something wrong—to you, of course, not to your dog. Your neighbor no more wrongs your dog than your car would be wronged if the windshield were smashed. Your neighbor's duties involving your dog are indirect duties to you. More generally, all of our duties regarding animals are indirect duties to one another—to humanity. 105-6

2) INTEREST IN LIFE MAKES HUMANS SUPERIOR

Rowlands, Department of Philosophy at Ireland U, 1998. [Mark, Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence]

relevantly similar interests with non-humans. Clearly we can have interests that they lack, and vice versa. Interestingly, all philosophers writing on animal ethics regard life, the interest in staying alive, as a relevantly different interest for humans and non-humans. That is, it is commonly thought that a normal human loses more in dying than does a non-human animal. Thus, a normal human's interest in life is not relevantly similar to that of a non-human animal. And if this is true, then treating humans and non-humans with equal consideration is compatible with according greater moral significance to the life of a normal human.



Granting Rights to Animals Violates System of Rights of Humans

Hsieh, Law Student, Harvard University, 1994 [Diana, <http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/tdoar.html>], "The Dangers of Animal Rights," December 6]

Granting Rights to animals violates system of rights of humans

Although animal rights activists would downplay the importance of the human capacity to reason, to use abstractions and logic, is the human consciousness, not any physical attribute, that enable our survival. Skyscrapers, breathtaking works of art, and even the books crusading for animal rights are only made possible by the use of reason. Granting rights to beings who cannot reason, who are incapable of understanding what rights are or why they should be respected would destroy the reciprocity of rights. Animals would be permitted to systematically violate the rights of humans, because animals could not do better, while humans would be bound by law to respect the rights of animals. This double standard would destroy the necessary coherence in a system of rights. By the same token, an animal who does not have free will, whose instincts determine its course of action would not be capable of choosing to respect rights, could not be said to have rights.



TI - giving animals rights will result in the loss of human rights.

Hsieh, Law Student, Harvard University, 1994 [Diana, <http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/tdoar.html>], "The Dangers of Animal Rights," December 6]

animals do not have what is properly called rights

Animal rights activists often argue that animals are entitled to the same sort of legal protection to which humans are entitled. This argument is justified by claiming either that animals have rights or that humans have moral obligations to animals that should be legally enforced. If animals have rights, they should be protected by the government. But if no such rights exist, then enacting laws which force humans to treat animals in a certain fashion would violate the legitimate rights of humans. In other words, the human rights of freedom of action and of property would be systematically undermined if animals were granted unwarranted protection by law. Because, ~~as I will show~~, all claims that animals have rights are illegitimate, attempts to legally protect animals from harm, no matter how well-intentioned, will inevitably result in the violation of human rights.

KNDL GT
ANTHRO SKIZNIT

1/3

Human Extinction Good

1. HUMAN EXTINCTION WOULD PROBABLY BE A GOOD THING

Anurag A. Agrawal, Entomology + Center for Population Biology, UC Davis 1997
Global Biodiversity Magazine, Volume 6, No. 3, VIEWS

Humans are parasites, and parasitism is an integral part of nature. There is nothing dirty, evil, or intrinsically negative about parasites. Remember, though, that the best parasites keep their hosts alive: a parasite without a host is a predator with no more food. Curiously, humans seem bent on destroying the Earth, our host. Do we simply exploit our host out of need?

Are human beings programmed for destruction? And if so, what does this mean for our survival? Is it bad or wrong? For most of humans time on Earth under low population levels, we have exploited without consequence. Metaphorically, we had left enough flowers and pollinators to ensure our and their reproductive success.

With a burgeoning population, this situation is changing. We are poised to be the instruments, direct and indirect, of extinction for many species. Possibly our own. Is that a bad thing? Extinction is not really taboo, it is only part of a natural cycle.


Let us not forget that our species is part of 'the cycle' -- only with the blessing or curse of freedom to override evolutionary forces (guns, eyeglasses, bulldozers, etc.).

Oil, wood, and cultivated shrimp from ponds are our equivalents of the nectar-robbers. Do I argue for the end of mining, forest clearing, and damming of rivers?

Of course not. This would simply be a reactionary view equal to the call for no nectar for the nectar-robber. But perhaps we have gotten too good at beating natural selection -- accelerating our cause with little regard to our symbiotic partners.

Are we doomed to extinction so soon? If so, it will not be caused by natural selection, but by self-imposed thoughtful selection, untrammelled freedom. Like other organisms, we manipulate the animate and inanimate world around us.

Parasitism, mutualism, and extinction are all of part of the cycle in our hands. The evolutionary process did not hard-wire humans to build things like computers -- it only gave us the potential hardware required. The same "technology" will either lead us to conservation or extinction.



TROGDOR > Everything

Human Extinction Good


2. HUMAN EXTINCTION WOULD NEITHER BE ~~NEW~~ UNIQUE NOR SURPRISING,
FOCUSING ON IT AS PARTICULARLY BAD IGNORES THOSE CHOICES HUMANS
STILL HAVE TO MAKE, AND ~~SHIELDS~~ ~~BARTERS~~ ANTHROCENTRIC THINKING

Lawrence L. Espey Biology, Trinity U Online 1975
<http://www.trinity.edu/lespey/culture/118essay.html> [8.26.00]

From the available evidence, it appears that "natural selection [operating throughout starvation, disease, and death] so often leads to extinction rather than to perfection" (104). The fossil remnants indicate that all the extinct species, which inhabited the Earth at some time during its long geologic history, vanished from the organic scene in either of two basic ways: (i) either by dying out altogether (upon arriving at an evolutionary dead-end), or (ii) by gradually evolving into another species (a process called speciation) (105). In either circumstance, a species which existed at one time disappears from the bios. It must therefore be concluded that extinction is a natural episode within the continuous process of organic evolution, an episode from which no species is immune (99). "Extinction--relatively rapid in the time scale of evolution--is the rule" (106). Thus, "evolution is not predestined to promote always the good and the beautiful" in the eyes of man (107).

But what about man? Is the species *Homo sapiens* in conformity with the dynamic pattern of organic evolution? A number of respected evolutionists doubt that humans are evolving today (108, 109). They believe that natural selection is essentially at a standstill, or at least is not operating in the normal way, so far as the adaptation of human beings to the natural environment (110, 111, 112). This stagnation, if it is veritable, may be crucial to the long range durability of mankind, because there is reason to believe that any species, if it is to survive to its maximum evolutionary potential, must be recurrently subjected to the process of natural selection.

If there is indeed a natural law which demands that all species evolve, or else be forced to extinction, then the great question becomes one of whether man is a part of material Nature, or above it (113). Certainly man is unique in his own way, but this does not mean that he is any "more unique than any other species that is a sole survivor of a genus and a family" (114). In fact, human beings are no more highly evolved than most other groups of present day mammals (115). Furthermore, mammals as a whole cannot justifiably be considered as more advanced than cephalopods or insects, in terms of success in a natural environment. Any notions to the contrary have resulted from the inescapable fact that it is man who has arranged all organisms in an evolutionary hierarchy. It is the human viewpoint that has placed mankind "at the summit of all creation," and we make our comparisons on this basis (115).



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

Human Extinction Good



Now I must ask (as Hume [18] surely would have), *which possibility is more extraordinary, that man is truly special, or that man only thinks he is special?* And, if you master the "relative sense" in responding to this question, you will find that man is "neither better nor worse than any other living thing" (116). To think otherwise is to harbor an illusion of the human consciousness. There is absolutely no tangible evidence to support the cherished sentiment that man is above material Nature. "Man is wholly and ineluctably embedded in the tissue of natural process" (117).

To comprehend the extent to which Nature possesses him, man need only realize his implicit dependence upon the (simple chloroplast). In order for animal life to exist, there was (and still is) the indubitable prerequisite of photosynthesis, the phenomenon by which plants absorb carbon dioxide (the principal animal waste), discharge oxygen (so vital to animal metabolism), and within the very same

operation utilize a fraction of the Sun's energy to transform light into nutriment for all other forms of life, including man (118). McHarg (119) has vividly expressed this dependency of the bios on the plant kingdom's ability to capture fragments of the Sun's rays before they re-radiate from the Earth into the vast Universe:


"All life now, the residue of all life past, the transformations of all life in all time all creatures and all men are based upon the chloroplast, turned to the sun, arresting and ordering its energy as it passes to disorder....[And so,] at least in thermodynamic terms, the world consist[s] of a working partnership between the sun and the leaf as man look[s] on-irrelevant, smiling benignly upon the scene, secure in the illusion of his primacy."

What else needs be said to confirm that human life is no more or less than Nature itself, that man is forever tied to "the physical processes and biological cycles from which all life slowly emerged through millions of years of evolution" (120). What more knowledge must flow from the Pierian spring to convince man that all life is a product of the evolution of inorganic nature, and that he himself is a product of the evolution of life. Homo sapiens is "nothing more or less than the result of natural selection in nature" (121), a natural process which ultimately demands natural extinction.

The very fact that humans are mortal beings should be sufficient evidence that man is exposed to the same basic laws of Nature as are the other members of the animal kingdom. Furthermore, it may be intensely relevant that the archaeological records have revealed at least (four subspecies) of *Homo sapiens* which have become/extinct in the recent past, i.e., Solo, Rhodesian, Neanderthal, and Cromagnon man (122).

"The same [general] principles which have governed natural processes in the past will continue to affect man just as they always have" (39). At some time in the future even twentieth-century man must be submitted once again to the miseries of natural selection--that "system of checks and balances" by which organic evolution

operates (123). Technology cannot indefinitely prevent "the necessity of disease and death" (124) and the "hard conditions of life" (125). How much longer man will survive before he reaches a similar dead-end (or undergoes speciation) is uncertain; however, based on the duration of other subspecies of sapiens, present-day man may be discarded from the evolutionary scene within no more than a few millennia.



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

Extinction ~~is~~ Impossible

1. THE EARTH WOULD SURVIVE ANY NUCLEAR POUNDING, FIXATION ON THE SO CALLED HUMAN SPECIES LEGITIMIZES ANY AND ALL ABUSES OF THOSE LABELLED 'NONHUMAN'. HUMAN EXTINCTION IS AN INEVITABILITY, INDIGNATION? REPULSION ABOUT IT ONLY ENDANGER ANYONE WHO MIGHT SURVIVE


John SEED *Reinforced Info later, New S. W. 06/01*

✗ We find here a level of our being that (noth, just nuclear holocaust destruction of the rainforest) gene pool (do not corrupt) The commitment to the world is not decreased by the new perspective, although the fear and anxiety were part of our motivation, start to dissipate and are replaced by a certain disinterestedness. We act because life is the only game in town, but actions from a disinterested, less attached consciousness may be more effective. Activists often don't have much time for meditation. The disinterested space we find here may be similar to meditation. Some teachers of meditation are embracing deep ecology 4 and vice versa. 5.

✗ Of all the species that have ever existed, it is estimated that less than one in a hundred exist today. The rest are extinct. As environment changes, any species that is unable to adapt, to change, to evolve, is extinguished. All evolution takes place in this fashion. In this way an oxygen-starved fish, ancestor of yours and mine, commenced to colonize the land. Threat of extinction is the potter's hand that molds all the forms of life.

is small low n The human species is one of millions threatened by imminent extinction through nuclear war and other environmental changes. And while it is true that the "human nature" revealed by 12,000 years of written history does not offer much hope that we can change our warlike, greedy, ignorant ways, the vastly longer fossil history assures us that we can change. We are that fish, and the myriad other death-defying feats of flexibility which a study of evolution reveals to us. A certain confidence (in spite of our recent "humanity") is warranted.

From this point of view, the threat of extinction appears as the invitation to change, to evolve. After a brief respite from the potter's hand, here we are back on the wheel again. The change that is required of us is not some new resistance to radiation, but a change in consciousness. Deep ecology is the search for a viable consciousness. Surely consciousness emerged and evolved according to the same laws as everything else - molded by environmental pressures. In the recent past, when faced with intolerable environmental pressures, the mind of our ancestors must time and again have been forced to transcend itself.




Extinction ~~is impossible~~ Impossible

2. DEATH OF ALL "HUMANS" IS IMPOSSIBLE

Gover + SCHILLING astronomy writer, Utrecht sky.a.b.com

★ But others have pointed out that the human animal (as opposed to human civilization) would be almost impossible to kill off completely at this point. People have become too widespread and too capable, a few pockets of individuals would find ways to survive almost any conceivable nuclear war or ecological collapse. These survivors would be enough to fully repopulate the Earth in a few thousand years -- and another technological civilization would arise more readily than the first one did, because there would be a precedent. Maybe this will happen many times.



KINDI GTT
ANTHRO SKENIT

1/2

Species Survival Focus Bad

— FOCUS ON SPECIES SURVIVAL DENIGRATES ALL MEMBERS OF THAT SPECIES AND ENSURES THAT THE TECHNOLOGIES OF DESTRUCTION DEVELOP SIDE BY SIDE WITH THOSE OF LIMITLESS REPRODUCTION.

Susanna KAEPPeler ex-feminist prof. Now a free lance writer in England and Germany. 1995 *Animals and Women*. p. 348-349

Species, nations, and ethnic communities are not just "communities" constituted through the self-determined choice of their individual members: they are collective entities requiring men and women (males and females) to serve that entity's reproduction. Neither are they historical communities determined by their actual members; they are transhistorical entities, constructs of the mind, endowed (by that mind) with a life that supersedes the lives of their individual members. Affirming the life of the collective entity means to affirm the instrumentalization of individuals as reproducers, sacrificing their lives and their right to life in the interest of the collective entity's survival. Reproduction becomes an interest on the meta-level of the collective, a positive expectation of individual members' reproductive activity. Reproductive choice thus ceases to be the right of individuals, their choice against reproduction becoming a threat to the species' survival.

Evaluation Focusing on the preservation of peoples, of species, of collective entities in the interest of maintaining for "the world" the rich multiplicity of life forms is equally to advocate species survival through reproduction, at the cost not only of the lives of individuals, but of the dignity of their living. This perspective is already so "naturalized" in the "scientific" Western perspective that environmentalists as well as scientists foreground the preservation of the multiplicity of life-forms and of the planet's genetic pool. Hence California scientists may propose to archive and explore the genetic information of the "Bushmen" of South Africa, the "Hill People" of New Guinea, African "Pygmies," the Yanomami of the Amazon, and the Basque people of Spain before they finally become extinct.⁴⁰ The dying out of these peoples is calmly presumed but genetics and reproductive technologies will preserve the survival of the genetic wealth of humanity. Instead of a political struggle in favor of securing living conditions for people in this world, we—the certain survivors continuing to live on this planet—invest in a scientific struggle to engineer their genetic survival—at the cost of the dignity of living people and for our own benefit after the people themselves may have died.

DIVERSITY
①

TO
CULTURE
=

SPECIES

②

①

THIS ANIMALS
SCIENCE
+ X ANIMALS
①

②



Every time you masturbate...
God kills a kitten
Please, think of the kittens

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHENIT

2/2

Species Survival Focus Bad




In this way the focus on species survival and extinction deflects attention from the need for political action on behalf of the oppressed where their survival as a "species" is assured through reproduction or, indeed, breeding. The necessity for support for Croatian and all other women raped receded behind the need to protect the Bosnian

p. 348
-349

Muslim people. People in the Third World may be oppressed, with thousands dying of poverty and hunger, yet the Western world's political focus is not on the elimination of the causes of this oppression, but on the contrary, on controlling their reproduction.¹ Similarly, factory animals produced for human consumption, scientific experimentation, and pet keeping—who therefore are in no danger of collective extinction, human breeding ensuring their "survival"—do not have the support of animal conservationists to end violence against them.⁴² While there is no suggested analogy between the groups of "objects"—people in oppressed conditions and animals in oppressed conditions—there is a similarity in the subjectivity producing that oppression, a similarity in the doing.

unc
can

"Breeding" is the answer of human science to the threat of extinction, with a technology developed side by side with the technology for the industrial mass destruction of people and life on the planet. The two technologies are two sides of the same intent: the engineered destruction of people, other living beings and life-forms, and the artificial "production of life" under the control of the superrace, the exterminators of all else. Behind the science of an "object world" is a scientific human subject with the desire to have complete power over that world.



KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

1/1

A2: Eco-Destruction Impx

3.

— THE IDEA THAT HUMANS COULD PREVENT ~~FROM~~ ECOLOGICAL
DEVASTATION IS ANTHROPOCENTRIC

Lawrence L. Espey Biology, Trinity U Online ⁷⁶⁵

<http://www.trinity.edu/lespey/culture/118essay.html> [8.26.00]

In the interim, I shall content myself with the hope (or illusion) that there is a natural ethic which mankind might decipher at some time in the future. Regretfully,

I do not know how to formulate such an ethic. I only know that it cannot be based on the assumption that human beings should become the "custodians of Nature."


FOLKS

FOLKS

FOLKS

Men would achieve nothing together if everyone were to adopt the belief that "I can save the Earth" (296). When men take this attitude, it is principally for themselves that they are concerned, rather than for Nature. And, this is the very kind of anthropocentric disposition that concerned White (33). It merely represents another example of man's effort to place himself above non-human Nature, instead of facing the more difficult task of determining his place within the natural environment.

THEMSELVES
THEIR



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens


A2: Nuclear Apocalypse Impx

1 ACCEPTING NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AS A POSSIBILITY HELPS OVERCOME HUMAN CENTERED HUBRIS AND PREPARE THE WORLD FOR THOSE WHO MIGHT SURVIVE.

Blake LEARMONTH middle school science teacher using
Eocentric Literature ... " 4/2001.

1 The immensity of geologic time has a different, often disorienting effect. It fights any human tendency toward Hubris, the belief that, godlike, we can control our fate or the fate of nature (Mullis 203). Big numbers are disorienting, and geologic time involves some very big numbers. The age of the Earth, for example is 4,600,000,000 years; a Earth's history time line with a scale where one millimeter equals one year stretches 4600 kilometers (2700 miles). At the same scale, all of human history fits easily on a classroom wall, with an individual lifetime being about the width of a human hair. Trying to put human environmental impact on desert environment in perspective Edward Abbey, states: "Growth for the sake of growth is a cancerous madness, Phoenix and Albuquerque will not be better cities to live in when their populations double again and again. ... No matter, it is of slight importance. Time and the winds will sooner or later bury the Seven Cities of Cibola, Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque, all of them, under dunes of glowing sand over which blue-eyed Navajo Bedouin will herd their sheep and horses" (Abbey 160). It may be reassuring or alienating to understand that even if we eventually cause our own extinction, the Earth will ultimately recover. Rather than becoming extinct we may evolve like the radiation-mutated people in Children of the Dust.

<4.6
Billion>



A2: Nuke Apocalypse ImpX

THE FEAR OF HUMAN EXTINCTION IMPLICIT IN THEIR CRISIS RHETORIC (AND EXPLICIT IN THE SCHELL CARD) ABSOLUTELY IGNORES ALL LIFE OUTSIDE OF THE CONSTRUCT OF HUMAN KIND, THIS ANTHROPOCENTRIC FOCUS ~~RE~~ DISAPPEARS IN THE BLINDING LIGHT OF THE IMAGINED OR REAL NUCLEAR FLASH

KARY MULLIS nobel 4 Chemistry 1994 'Walking Naked...' p 204-5



What happened in the 1980s? We have brought something down on ourselves as expensive, although not quite as brutal, as a world war. Did everybody forget that we were just big

ANTHRO

ants? Did somebody convince us that just because most of our

②

religions had lost their appeal, we ourselves were suddenly

HARDY

gods? That we were now the masters of the planet and the

guardians of the status quo? That the precise climatic condi-

✓

tions that happen to exist on the Earth today in the Holy Twentieth Century, the Climatic Century of 001, the first year of human domination of all of Earth, should be here forever, in

secula seculorum? All the good species are here now. None

shall perish and no new ones are welcome. Biology is no

longer allowed: the Environmental Protection Agency and the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are now in charge.

Evolution is over.

↑
(THIS MEANS THIS BIGOTRY MAY WELL BE "HUMAN")

③ THAT THEIR RHETORIC MAKES ANTHROPOCENTRISM INVISIBLE



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

KNOT GT
Anthro Shizbut

Speciesism 13-1

Speciesism uses the same logic as racism + sexism

Rowlands, Department of Philosophy at Ireland U, 1998. [Mark, Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence]


Remarkably, defenders of animal liberation are sometimes attacked for this claim, as if it somehow demeaned the fight against racism or sexism to have non-human animals mentioned in the same breath. However, the comparison is perfectly legitimate. This can be seen simply from the fact that the argument described above is simply one instance of a more general argument form:

P1. Individual members of group X possess a substantial set of moral entitlements including, fundamentally, the entitlement to equal consideration and respect.

P2. There are no morally relevant differences between individual members of group X and individual members of group Y.

C. Therefore, individual members of group Y also possess a substantial set of moral entitlements including, fundamentally, the entitlement to equal consideration and respect.

It is because the fundamental argument for animal liberation is an instance of this more general form that we could make use of essentially the same argument against the namuh in a bid to achieve human liberation. And it is because the argument for animal liberation is an instance of this more general form that the comparison with arguments against racism and sexism is both legitimate and logically compelling. If there is a difference between the cases against racism and sexism, on the one hand, and the case against speciesism on the other, it is not in virtue of the logical form of the arguments these cases instantiate. The logical form is, in each case, identical.



RNOJ GT
Anthro Shizant

Speciesism Good

Speciesism is just clarification of scientific data

Hsieh, Law Student, Harvard University, 1994 [Diana, <http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/tdoar.html>, "The Dangers of Animal Rights," December 6]

The force of the accusation of "speciesism" rests upon a fallacious analogy between speciesism and sexism or racism. Sexism and racism attempt use inessential traits, like sex, skin color, and ethnic origin, as indicators of intellectual inferiority. In contrast, speciesism is the recognition that there are real differences in mental and physical ability within the animal kingdom which ought to affect our treatment of other animals. For example, recognizing the important distinctions between housecats and lions and treating each species accordingly is, at the very least, simple prudence, for refusing to recognize these differences could result in severe injury. It is a fact that humans have a more advanced consciousness than any other known species which gives them an incredible advantage in the natural world. It is a fact that to vocate the interests of another species at the expense of one's own interests will eventually bring death.



ACCOUNTS OF ANIMAL CRUELTY ARE STILL FUNDAMENTALLY SPECIEIST

Lynda BIRKE biology, women's studies @ U of Warwick. 1995 Animals and Women. P. 11

AT:
(PASSIVE
VOICED)
ACCOUNTS OF
ANIMAL CRUELTY

The writing, moreover, is itself constructed in ways that diminish the significance of the animal. Gross (1990) suggests that the widespread use of the passive voice in scientific papers "is a routine means for making physical objects and events the subjects of scientific sentences" (73). Phrases such as "the animals were injected" are typical. Here, the animals are indeed the subject of the verb; but they do not become "subjects" in the more philosophical sense. What the passive voice does is to remove the scientist from the sentence, so reducing the emotional impact on the reader of what is done to the animal.¹⁰

⊗ →

Gross (1990) emphasizes the construction of scientific papers as fictionalized idealized accounts in which "style... is not a window on reality, but the vehicle of an ideology that systematically mis describes experimental and observational events" (84). Lynch (1988) similarly contrasts the idealized account of the written records, with what he terms "laboratory shop talk". Conversation, unlike written records, typically makes reference to "what can go wrong." It can also make reference to a more empathic feeling for the animals; Wieder (1980) has described, for example, how scientists working with chimpanzees may make reference to the cognitive abilities of the animals in conversation, but this awareness is lost in written accounts. If the written accounts of science reflect a seemingly objective ideology, conversations among scientists are much more ambivalent. On one hand, scientists may use language clearly reminiscent of the "air of bravado." So what if an animal dies, I was once told, "there's more where that came from." Lynch recalls the crude language and repartee accompanying scientists' repeated attempts to inject a rat successfully. Yet, on the other hand, scientists also express feelings about the animals and acknowledge the need for empathy and "good handling" (Lynch 1988), even though open discussion of these feelings is not encouraged. Indeed, Arluke (1992) found that even talking about having interviewed scientists who expressed unease met with resistance in scientific circles.



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

HDDI GT
ANTHROSHIZNIT

MORALS/ETHICS


animals can't be moral agents b/c they
are always self-conscious

Hargrove, Professor in Department of Philosophy, 1992. [Eugene C., University of North Texas, State U. of NY Press]

Second, it might be objected that animals cannot or need not understand moral principles because moral principles are human artifacts. One answer is that humans and their works are a part of nature, so moral principles are as much a part of the animals' natural environment as any other. As to why they should bother with moral principles, I'm reduced to suggesting that maybe they want to, and obviously humans sometimes want them to.

Third, some people say that they will believe that chimpanzees, for example, are self-conscious when they tell us they are. A few chimpanzees in their use of signs of self-reference come very close to doing just this. However, behaviorists consider verbal as just another form of publicly observable communicative behavior (without countenancing introspective accompaniments), and, on this basis, some nonhuman animals exhibit behavior which is as adequate (admittedly on the criticized argument from analogy) for concluding that they have the six reciprocity framework characteristics (behaviorally defined) as is human behavior for the same conclusion.

Finally, there is a very difficult problem about how to treat an animal that is only sometimes a moral agent. These animals would be moral entities in having the first five characteristics of the reciprocity framework, but, as anyone knows who has much to do with, say, dogs or chimpanzees, they sometimes seem to lose the ability to intend to act with respect to moral principles which at other times they have. Such a loss affected Camus' stranger.



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

KNOW OF
Anthony Shaw

Animals to act on morals

one must be able to understand and act
on moral principles to have them.

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 2-3]

Accordingly, if the primary way to gain moral worth is to act according to moral duties, then any entities that cannot act according to moral duties—such as stones, crickets, and trees—cannot perform duties, neither does it make sense to say that they have moral duties. Thus, one must be a moral agent—a being who relates morally to others—in order to earn rights. I outline below the six necessary and (in combination) sufficient characteristics for being a moral agent.

The primary characteristic required of a moral agent is *self-consciousness*. To act at all, and particularly to get credit for acting morally, an agent must, first of all, act from within its own self. Further, the action must be *free* (the agent could have acted otherwise), and it must be *intentional*. Both of these characteristics depend further on the ability of the agent to *understand moral principles*, and on his *understanding in the instant* the principle according to which he is freely and intentionally acting. It seems fairly obvious that an entity cannot be said to have a duty unless he is capable of understanding that duty. It is less obvious that an entity cannot be said to have a right unless he is capable of understanding that right, but I agree that this is both plausible and true because both duty-bearing and right-bearing behavior—according to or opposed to duties and rights—depend on understanding them. In short, to behave with reference to moral principles, one must understand them. The Greek maxim that action merely in accord with proper behavior does not merit moral praise, but only action done with the intent to behave properly, implies that one must understand both one's duties *and* rights in order to have them. Otherwise, one does not behave in a moral milieu and one's behavior cannot be evaluated morally (but see below, sections III and IV). Finally, it is generally assumed that the agent is *physically capable*, at least potentially, of carrying out the action. Thus, someone who is constrained, or paralyzed, or ill, and thus cannot act freely, may be accorded moral worth if he knows his duty and would intentionally do it if he could. Good intentions—intent to act according to duty—also often give moral worth even if they fail, and, in some cases, even when the results (that the agent could not have anticipated) are bad.

MEAT...
Is Murder...

— ANIMALS ARE NOT MORAL BEINGS & THUS SHOULDN'T HAVE RIGHTS

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 7]

Both the empirical and the supernatural positions are *humanistic* in that according to them rights and duties apply intrinsically or primarily only to human beings. Human beings may decide to take on nonreciprocally certain unsanctioned duties to nonhuman nature, and to accord to nature certain unearned rights or claims on human beings. But relationships between human beings and nonhuman nature with respect to rights and duties are held on both these views to differ drastically from reciprocal moral relations among human beings. I believe that the reciprocity framework of section 1 provides the explanation for this claim that only humans populate the moral milieu, a claim shared by advocates of these two radically different positions.

() 6 req. to have moral rights

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 3]

The explanatory analysis I am advocating, then, is that to have moral worth, to have moral rights, or to be a primary part of a moral milieu, an entity must be a moral agent, which requires that it have:

1. self-consciousness,
2. capability of understanding moral principles about rights and duties,
3. freedom to act either according to or opposed to given principles of duty,
4. understanding of given principles of duty,
5. physical capability (or potentiality) of acting according to duty, and
6. intention to act according to or opposed to given principles of duty.

6 requirements
to have
moral
worth

"given it's a penis..."

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

✓

AT: UTILITARIANISM

— Must Reject Utilitarianism ethic in favor
of a Rights view of Nature

Regan, author, 1983


[Tom, The case for animal Rights, U of Cali @ Berkeley]

Animals in Science, Utilitarianism, and Animal Rights

The fundamental differences between utilitarianism and the rights view are never more apparent than in the case of the use of animals in science. For the utilitarian, whether the harm done to animals in pursuit of scientific ends is justified depends on the balance of the aggregated consequences for all those affected by the outcome. If the consequences that result from harming animals would produce the best aggregate balance of good over evil, then harmful experimentation is obligatory. If the resulting consequences would be at least as good as what are otherwise obtainable, then harmful experimentation is permissible. Only if harmful experimentation would produce less than the best consequences would it be wrong. For a utilitarian to oppose or support harmful experimentation on animals, therefore, requires that he have the relevant

facts—who will be benefited or harmed, how much, and so on. *Everyone's* interests, including the interests of those who do the tests or conduct the research, their employers, the dependents of these persons, the retailers and wholesalers of cages, animal breeders, and others, must be taken into account and counted equitably. For utilitarians, such *side effects count*. The animals used in the test have no privileged moral status. Their interests must be taken into account, to be sure, but not any more than anybody else's interests.

As is "almost always" the case, utilitarians simply fail to give us what is needed—the relevant facts, facts that we must have, given their theory, to determine whether use of animals in science is or is not justified. Moreover, for a utilitarian to claim or imply that there must be something wrong with a given experiment, if the experimenter would not be willing to use a less intelligent, less aware human being but would be willing to use a more intelligent, more aware animal, simply lacks a utilitarian basis. For all we know, and for all the utilitarian has thus far told us, the consequences of using such an animal, all considered, might be better than those that would result from using the human being. It is not *who* is used, given utilitarian theory, that matters; it is *the consequences* that do.



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ANTHRO STENZIT

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
AT util cent



The rights view takes a very different stand. No one, whether human or animal, is ever to be treated as if she were a mere receptacle, or as if her value were reducible to her possible utility for others. We are, that is, never to harm the individual merely on the grounds that this will or just might produce "the best" aggregate consequences. To do so is to violate the rights of the individual. That is why the harm done to animals in pursuit of scientific purposes is wrong. The benefits derived are real enough; but some gains are ill-gotten, and all gains are ill-gotten when secured unjustly.

So it is that the rights view issues its challenge to those who do science: advance knowledge, work for the general welfare, but not by allowing practices that violate the rights of the individual. These are, one might say, the terms of the new contract between science and society, a contract that, however belatedly, now contains the signature of those who speak for the rights of animals. Those who accept the rights view, and who sign for animals, will not be satisfied with anything less than the total abolition of the harmful use of animals in science—in education, in toxicity testing, in basic research. But the rights view plays no favorites. No scientific practice that violates human rights, whether the humans be moral agents or moral patients, is acceptable. And the same applies to those humans who, for reasons analogous to those advanced in the present chapter in regard to nonhumans, should be given the benefit of the doubt

about having rights because of the weight of our ignorance—the newly born and the soon-to-be born. Those who accept the rights view are committed to denying any and all access to these "resources" on the part of those who do science. And we do this not because we oppose cruelty (though we do), nor because we favor kindness (though we do), but because justice requires nothing less.




KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNOT

A/2 Animals voting (?)

Animal rights are as broad as humans', they still can't vote.

Peter Singer 85 (philosophy, bioethics, Monash University. Author, "In Defense of Animals" prologue) p. 6-7

AT: It does not mean that animals have all the same rights as you and I
animal have. Animal liberationists do not minimize the obvious differences
rights between most members of our species and members of other species.
→ The rights to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of worship – none of
animals these can apply to other animals. Similarly, what harms humans
voting may cause much less harm, or even no harm at all, to some animals.
↓ If I were to confine a herd of cows within the boundaries of the
county of, say, Devon, I do not think I would be doing them any
harm at all; if, on the other hand, I were to take a group of people and
restrict them to the same county, I am sure many would protest that
I had harmed them considerably, even if they were allowed to bring
their families and friends, and notwithstanding the many undoubted
attractions of that particular county. Humans have interests in
mountain-climbing and skiing, in seeing the world and in sampling
foreign cultures. Cows like lush pastures and shelter from harsh
weather. Hence to deny humans the right to travel outside Devon
would be to restrict their rights significantly; it would not be a
significant restriction of the rights of cows.



KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT


AT: ZOOS ARE GOOD

1.) ZOOS HARM ANIMALS

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

^{ye} [Zoos. Zoos are a popular form of entertainment in the United States.⁴⁹ Over one thousand species of animals are kept in large zoos and in smaller roadside zoos across the country. These animals are captured from their natural habitats, bred in zoos' captive-breeding programs, or purchased or borrowed from other zoos. They are often forced to travel long distances in cramped containers, and many animals arrive ill, injured, or dead.

The conditions of many American zoos can only be described as deplorable. Animals are kept in barren cages that provide no physical or mental stimulation whatsoever. When zoos advertise "natural habitats," this usually means concrete banks and "trees" made of plastic resin with metal "leaves"; electric fencing surrounds any real vegetation. Off-exhibit areas, which are hidden from public view but in which animals spend most of their lives, remain unchanged by such upgrades and are nothing more than cages. Animals in zoos—even "good" zoos, or those with "natural habitats"—often exhibit neurotic, stress-induced behaviors, such as pacing, head bobbing, weaving back and forth, and throwing feces at humans. Some animals develop ulcers, others infections in their feet from standing in urine and excrement. The stress of confinement prevents some animals from engaging in normal behaviors like sex and childbearing, as evidenced by the difficulties that zoos have had in getting certain species to reproduce in captive-breeding programs.]



KNOI GT
Andrew Shizenit

A/2 Singer

A/1 Singer

established no status for animal interests.

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 15 1

Even after accepting that (many) nonhuman animals are sentient, however, the question of whether or not they have interests as humans do still remains. In section IV I conclude, not unlike Singer, that some do. Singer's argument that they do, nevertheless, must be considered in detail because it is often offered in a form that is fallacious. Briefly, Singer (and many others) jumps from statements about the differing interests of different classes of humans to claims about rights of animals based on their "interests." The argument is fallacious because nonhuman animals are not shown by it to have interests in the relevant sense that humans do.

animals
don't
have
human
interests

"
Only in America
would there be a
gay - hate crack
musn't good enough"

KNOI GT
Anthro Shizuit

A/2 Leopold

AT/ "Land = Rights"
Leopold

Hargrove, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at University of North Texas, 1992
[Eugene, editor. The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate pp. 10]

so Leopold
"the land"
doesn't have
Rts

value from fact, which is a procedure generally rejected by philosophers. The mere existence of "the land" is neither an explanation of nor a justification for its having rights. Consider the entirely natural possibility that these entities do not exist. If they do not exist, they do not (on his ground) have a right to exist. Furthermore, if their right to exist depends on their existence, then, if they are destroyed, their rights are destroyed. And once they no longer exist, there are no longer any rights anyone could appeal to to blame the destroyers or to deplore the destruction. The paradoxical situation would be that they have a right to existence only until they are deprived of existence.

Forget about illegal drugs...
all you need is Nyquil + soda

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHZNIT

AT: DEEP ECO


— DEEP ECOLOGY → 200,000+ DEATHS A YEAR

Marti KHEEL writer about ecofeminism and animal liberation. 1995
Animals and Women, p. 111

ENVIRE
MUST
CONSIDER
INDIVIDUALS

Environmental philosophy and the environmental movement as a whole have failed to incorporate a genuine concern for individual beings. Currently, no major environmental organization is willing to express opposition to hunting, and none takes a position on eating meat.¹² But until the environmental movement and environmental philosophy develop a concern for individual beings, they will be living in the shadow of their violent past. Hunters currently kill more than 200 million animals every year. They cripple, harass and orphan millions more. An ecofeminist ethic must deplore this, along with all other expressions of violence. It must seek to sever the connections that historically have bound the environmental movement to a practice of violence. An ecofeminist ethic must help us to realize that, since we do not need to hunt or eat meat for survival, we should do neither. Rather, we should all engage in a genuine celebration which recognizes that the best gift that we can offer to and receive from animals is their continued lives.

A/R Deont



KNDI GT
ANTHRO SH

AT: DEEP ECO

LAND ETHIC ^{ASKS} ~~DEEP~~ EACH OF US TO DIE

Linda VANCE California Inst. Of integral studies, SF. Lecturer,
summer time Ranger @ San Juan / Rio Grande national forest in
Durango, CA. 1995 Animals and Women. P. 173

AT:
TIE
LAND
ETHIC/
DEEP ECO

Although it avoids the crude "good animal/bad animal" fantasy of anthropocentric positions, the land ethic continues to distinguish between classes of animals. For domestic animals, the outcome of the story is predetermined: they will be meat. For wild animals, a degree of chance is possible: although, as land ethic proponent Baird Callicott observes, "the most fundamental fact of life in the biotic community is eating . . . and being eaten" (57), wild animals may exercise their own cunning, luck, and strength to effectively co-author their life stories.

Most significantly, however, the land ethic does not allow for the consideration of particularly situated individuals: everything exists as a specimen, a representative of a type, and is judged as such. An individual life has no value unless, of course, that individual is among the last of its kind. And while conflicts between individuals may arise, they are irrelevant unless their resolution will affect "the land."

DEEP ECOLOGY IS A SHALLOW EXCUSE FOR KILLING

Linda VANCE California Inst. Of integral studies, SF. Lecturer,
summer time Ranger @ San Juan / Rio Grande national forest in
Durango, CA. 1995 Animals and Women. P. 174

AT:
DEEP ECO

Deep ecology barely acknowledges the existence of animals as animals, or, indeed, of any creature as an embodied individual. As ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1991, 1993) has argued, it is a philosophy of mind, an abstraction that renders our daily existence inconsequential. In this respect, it makes possible stories about animals that are just as discouraging as those spun out by any other ethical theory. Like the land ethic, deep ecology takes notice of particular specimens of animal, that is, those that are rare or endangered, but only because their disappearance would make the world less diverse and complex, and thus diminish the Self. One could, of course, extend the idea of self-realization to animals, and attempt to argue that hunting an animal, or killing it for food, prevents it from realizing its full potential, but deep ecology seems unconcerned with such matters. In fact, Naess supports so called "wildlife management" (*Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle*) while Americans Bill Devall and George Sessions go so far as to suggest that hunting can help develop a "sense of place and intuitive understanding of the connections between humans and nonhumans, with a respect for the principle of biocentric equality" (188). And in this country, at least, deep ecologists are notoriously contemptuous of domestic animals, condemning them as human artifacts having negative impact on diversity. In short, from a deep ecology perspective, both humans and their animal creations are quintessentially bad animals, embodied forms to be scorned and rejected in pursuit of union with abstract "nature."



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

KNDI GT
ANTHRO ETHNIC

AT: DEEP ECO

— DEEP ECOLOGY IS SUBSTANTIVELY NIHILISM, ITS WORSHIP
OF ABSTRACT TERMS BLINDS IT TO INDIVIDUALS

Karen DAVIS founder, president, and director of United Poultry
Concerns, she writes a lot about poultry issues too. 1995 Animals and
Women, p. 202-203

A question for environmentalism concerns the nature of the big
realm it claims to represent and worry about. If, ecologically re-
garded, the concrete manifestations of existence are inconsequential,
what substance does this realm possess? What are its contents and
where do they reside exactly? Can the ecosphere be thus hollowed
out without being converted to a shell? An ecologist once said in an
interview that the individual life is a mere "blip on a grid" compared
to the life process." Yet, it may be that there is no "life process" apart

from the individual forms it assumes, whereby we infer it. The
"process" is an inference, an abstraction, and while there is nothing
wrong with generalizing and speculating on the basis of experience,
to verify the unknown at the expense of the known shows a perversity
of will. How is it possible, as the environmentalist asserts, to worry
about "all the plants and creatures" of a system while managing to
avoid caring about each and every one? Why would anyone want not
to care?

AT:
DE
ECO-
ABUS-
ETHIC.

I know of no composer or lover of music who disparages the
individual notes of a composition the way some environmentalists
scorn the individual animals of this world. Maybe this is because the
musically educated person perceives in each note the universe of
song that note in turn helps to create. The poet William Blake said
that we must learn to see the universe in a grain of sand. We must
learn with equal justice and perception to hear the music of the
spheres in the cluck of a chicken, starting with the hen who, histo-
rian Page Smith says, "is rich in comfortable sounds, chirps and
chirrs, and, when she is a young pullet, a kind of sweet singing that is
full of contentment when she is clustered together with her sisters
and brothers in an undifferentiated huddle of peace and well-being
waiting for darkness to envelop them" (Smith and Daniel 1975, 334).
If I think like a mountain, will I be able to hear this hen singing?

NIHILISM
COMMENT
PURE FORM
WORSHIP

QUEST.

To accept the environmentalist argument that the suffering of
individual animals is inconsequential compared to the ozone layer,
we must be willing to admit that the sufferings of minority groups,
raped women, battered wives, abused children, people sitting on
death row, and our loved ones are small potatoes beneath the hole in
the sky. To worry about any of them is, in effect, to miniaturize the
big picture to portraits of battered puppy dogs? Or does environmen-
talism shift to the more convenient ground, when it comes to hu-
mans and oneself, where all species are equal but one species is more
equal than others and membership has its privileges? An environ-
mentalists writes: "We care about bears and buttercups for them-
selves, but also for us humans. That's the selfish Cartesian bottom
line." I think, therefore I deserve a hospitable environment" (Knox
1991, 37). The reasoning may or may not be sound; the sensibility
makes my hackles rise.



KNDI 6T
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

NARRATIVES

NARRATIVES SUPPOSEDLY FROM A NON HUMAN POINT OF VIEW TRANSMUTES ANTHROPOCENTRISM INTO SUBTLER FORMS

Linda VANCE California Inst. of integral studies, SF. Lecturer,
summer time Ranger @ San Juan / Rio Grande national forest in
Durango, CA. 1995 Animals and Women. P. 165-166

AN
NARRATIVE
→ The problem with moral tales, of course, is that they require us to
depart from the particular, and to chase after the general, universaliz-
able truth. The frogs are effectively gone, then, long before the pond
dries up; they disappear as soon as I impose a narrative on them. But
the point of most human narrative, of course, is to illuminate the
human experience, so it should come as no surprise that narratives
about animals and nature tend to be human centered, or to exist for
ANTHROPO human edification.

If this human centeredness were only a curious feature of nature
writing, an increasingly popular genre but a minor one nonetheless,
it might not be cause for concern. But unfortunately, story-making is
not so limited. One of the major contributions of postmodernism
thus far has been to challenge us to recognize that all human knowl-
edge is essentially narrative, just story in the making. We do not so
much discover the natural world as we construct it; this is true
whether we are nature writers or ecologists, environmental law-
yers or ethicists, historians or geographers. We impose our cultural
and descriptive narratives on the world like templates (text creating)
1. (text)

